I examine the role of bank size in the allocation of assets using unexpected deposit shocks from shale gas development. The use of hydraulic fracturing to extract gas and oil has resulted in significant cash windfalls to local landowners. These windfalls lead to unsolicited deposit shocks to local banks. I compare the allocation decisions of both small and medium sized banks exposed to similar shocks over the business cycle. I find that the smallest banks allocate a greater portion of their proceeds to reduce non-deposit borrowing and increase holdings of liquid securities. The heterogeneity in bank allocation is most significant during the 2007-2009 time period. During this period, larger banks allocated more of their incremental funds to small business and commercial and industrial loans. The results are consistent with bank size as an important factor in banks' capital allocation decisions. The findings suggest incremental deposits are more likely to be lent by large banks, particularly during downturns. * Thanks to Doug Diamond, Anil Kashyap, Steven Kaplan, and Amit Seru for helpful comments.
Introduction
Resource misallocation can severely inhibit total factor productivity.
1 The financial sector, and in particular banks, play an important role in the allocation of capital. However, banks may face constraints on their ability to raise and reallocate capital. Prior research has explored the impact of political influence, the institutional environment, collateral constraints, access to information and external financing costs.
2 In this paper I examine an additional source of friction, constraints on a bank's scope. Banks are unique in that they are largely financed by informationally insensitive shortterm debt in the form of insured deposits. This funding source can be subject to unsolicited positive shocks that are unrelated to the banks investment opportunities. Larger banks have access to a broader set of investments, while smaller banks are more constrained by geography, size and expertise. A smaller bank that has exhausted its investment opportunities will invest at lower returns and hold more arms-length securities and cash. If small banks warehouse depositor funds in these lower return assets, they 'trap' capital that is better utilized elsewhere.
I empirically investigate the role of bank size in asset allocation by examining the impact of a positive shock to banks' deposits on capital allocation decisions. I focus the investigation on the U.S. banking sector. While the U.S. is often viewed as a a model for resource allocation due to its developed financial sector (Hsieh and Klenow (2009) , Rajan and Zingales (1998) ), it remains a useful laboratory for examining banking heterogeneity. Despite deregulation, the U.S. has over 7,000 banks with less than $1 billion in assets. These banks operate under a consistent legal and regulatory structure. Regulatory filings provide ample data on the holdings of these banks and their capital allocation decisions.
Any examination of bank asset allocations must address the endogeneity of investment opportunities and deposits. This endogeneity can take on two forms: Banks with more investment opportunities seek deposits and geographies with more deposits have more/less credit demand. These issues are particularly difficult to address when analyzing small banks where deposits and lending are geographically concentrated.
I address the first concern by exploiting a local wealth shock which results in unsolicited shocks to deposits. I then compare the response of small and medium sized banks exposed to the same shock to limit the bias from a local demand shock. Since 2001, rising energy prices and innovations in drilling technology have resulted in the development of several new oil and gas fields throughout the United States. This development is primarily conducted by multinational corporations, using sophisticated techniques such as hydraulic fracturing, 'fracking', and horizontal drilling. The success of these fields has resulted in significant windfalls to local landholders who receive royalties and leasing payments from drillers.
During the period 2001-2009, I identify ten oil and gas fields that impact fifty three counties and one hundred sixty five different banks. I obtain drilling and production data from various state agencies. Using the county-level deposit data from the FDIC, I observe large increases in local deposits ( Figure 1 ) that are correlated with estimated cash payments to local landowners. These deposit increases are in excess of other changes that might impact deposits, including wage increases. Using bank regulatory filings and the FDIC's Summary of Deposits, I construct a panel of bank balance sheet data that is linked to deposits at the county level. I then aggregate the county-level excess deposit shock at the bank level, weighting county-level deposit growth by banks' deposits in the county.
The treatment groups of banks is small relative to the population, therefore I create a control group using propensity score matching. I use two-stage-least-squares to instrument for deposit growth using the unsolicited deposit shock. Banks exposed to the deposit shock are more likely to allocate deposits toward cash and securities relative to an endogenous change in deposits. The analysis also indicates unsolicited deposit shocks lead to reduced bank borrowing. The findings are consistent with an unsolicited shock, as they appear to reduce the expected correlation bias between deposits and lending.
To explore the role of bank size on allocations, I interact the change in deposits with the log of bank assets. I estimate this non-linear IV, by instrumenting for both the change in deposits and the interaction term between deposits and size. I find that the role of bank scale is state dependent. In good times (2005) (2006) larger banks on average invest more unsolicited funds in loans, but the relationship is not statistically significant. However, in bad times (2007) (2008) (2009) , large banks are much more likely to lend the incremental deposits. I also find that small bank loan-to-deposit ratios decline significantly more than their peers during the downturn and on average they allocate funds to securities rather than loans or cash. I conduct a number of robustness tests to better identify the impact of bank size. I include county fixed-effects to be sure the impact is not county specific, with large banks selecting into counties with more investment opportunities. I also test the role of 3 local credit demand. Shale gas shocks may be concurrent with a change local demand for credit, if the local shock impacts small banks differently than large banks, the local demand shock can bias the results. I use changes in small business lending by large banks in the county who are relatively immune from the deposit shock to proxy for changes in credit demand. The key results are robust to the inclusion of fixed effects and the credit demand proxy. Given an unsolicited desposit shock, small banks lend less and purchase more securities, particularly during the crisis period.
Overall, evidence is consistent with bank size as an important determinant in capital allocation. The smallest banks take-in deposits that they are less likely to lend. This heterogeneity in capital allocation may have important implications for the analysis of government interventions. In addition, this analysis suggests that the smallest banks benefit from deposit insurance, allowing them to attract deposits that would otherwise be directed to more moderately sized banks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates how scale can enter the banks decision and summarizes the empirical strategy. Section 3 introduces the data and provides some background on shale gas development and its impact on bank deposits. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 concludes.
Empirical Strategy
A simple model of a bank's portfolio problem illustrates the potential impact of scale on the allocation of assets. The model is a variation on 'lending channel' models ( (Bernanke and Blinder 1988) , (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997) , and (Stein 1998)) in which sources of funding are imperfect substitutes (Myers and Majluf 1984) . Banks optimize their allocation of assets between loans and more liquid investments given a resource constraint in the form of an accounting identity (assets must equal bank liabilities) and increasingly costly external financing. I include heterogeneity in the number of bank investment opportunities to illustrate how bank scale might enter the problem. I also introduce credit demand to motivate a discussion of identification concerns.
A Bank Lending Model
Bank i must allocate assets into loans, L t i , and cash, C 
Deposits pay a fixed rate r D to lenders, while external financing costs rise with borrowing ρ(B t i ); deposits and other sources of financing are imperfect substitutes. Deposits are determined exogenously, hence the bank maximizes profits by choosing the optimal mix of lending, cash and the level of external financing subject to the budget constraint.
Credit demand is indexed by the state variable Z t i,j . I introduce this state variable so as to better understand how it may impact the bank's lending decision and bias my empirical results. The rate of return for loans by bank i at location j at time t is R(Z t i,j , L t i,j ). R is increasing in the state variable and decreasing in lending to j.
4 C t i are allocations to cash, arms-length securities at a constant rate r f .
Assuming an interior solution, the first order necessary condition for (2.2) equates the marginal return on additional lending with the marginal cost of additional financing.
Local lending is therefore a function of the local state variables, deposits and non-local state variables,
I assume linear functional forms to illustrate the solution,
3 Deposits may in fact be correlated with other variables, but I am assuming all or a portion of deposit funding is outside the bank's control. 4 There are a number of reasons banks may face decreasing returns. The cost structure of banks may face diminishing returns from scale. Adverse selection may decrease the quality of projects as interest rates are lowered. Even if lending opportunities are elastically supplied, risk aversion or the costs of delegated monitoring (Diamond 1984) may limit a banks desire to further invest in an asset class or geography.
5 If no external capital is used, loan returns must equate to the cost of deposits or the return on cash, whichever is higher. Once banks reach the corner where external capital is either internal or deposits, they will equate lending returns to r f . Supply of funds will be perfectly elastic until external capital is required, there is no impact from a deposit shock.
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Using these and plugging (2.1) into (2.3) I can write loans as a function of deposits, where cash-holdings are at a corner solution.
Differencing over time implies the following
(2.6) Equation (2.6) decomposes changes in bank lending into a credit supply (the first term) and credit demand (the second term). With an interior solution there is a symmetric response to changes in external finance. The key takeaway is that sensitivity to deposit shocks varies with banks' investment opportunity set, N . The scale in this model directly impacts the marginal productivity of incremental funding. As scale increases, the opportunity set for investment is more elastic. Smaller banks are less sensitive, as they exhaust their profitable opportunities.
This heterogeneity also impacts their exposure to credit demand shocks. Greater scope reduces the impact of local credit demand shocks on aggregate lending. Typically we think of small banks as being more sensitive to external financing shocks. If ρ is decreasing with N the deposit sensitivity is indeterminant with respect to N . The interaction between banks' opportunities and their external financing costs generates heterogenous sensitivity to the impact of shocks.
Identification Strategy
The purpose of the empirical strategy is to estimate the role of banks' scope in their capital allocation decision. The illustrative model (Eq. (2.6)) motivates the following regression, where ∆ indicates time-differencing,X denotes a demeaned variable, and θ t i is bank scope. ∆L
6 For simplicity I focus on the case where the solution results in C t i = 0. There are a number of regulatory reasons cash and securities may be set at a positive number, but these cases do not change the primary intuition -lending and borrowing is increasing with N , investments in cash/securities are decreasing in N .
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To simplify the comparability of this equation across banks of different size, I scale each ∆ term by lagged asset size, A t−2 i . A 10% shock to ∆D implies a 10% shock to liabilities, ceteris paribus. λ D (θ t i ) is the share of this increase allocated to new lending. I have included time fixed effects τ t to capture aggregate fluctuations. ε t i is meant to capture any unexplained variation that may be the result of measurement error or other omitted variables.
Estimating the above equation presents a few challenges. First, credit demand ∆Z t i is difficult to observe and is likely correlated with deposits. Hence, OLS of loan changes on deposits will be biased. Second, the coefficients on deposits and demand are non-linear functions of bank size.
I decompose credit demand into two components: Credit demand driven by the bank, z i , and credit demand driven by local demand, ζ j .
The covariance of omitted variables with my regressor of interest, ∆D t i , will bias my coefficient estimates. Covariance between z i and deposits I call 'selection' -banks with positive credit demand shocks grow deposits to fund their loan opportunities. Covariance between ζ j and deposits I consider 'local demand' bias -household wealth impacts both deposits and loan demand.
I introduce an unsolicited demand shockD * t i and assume E(D * t i ∆z t i ) = 0 and E(D * t i ∆ζ t j ) = 0 for non shale gas counties. The shock is based on the increases in deposits in counties experiencing significant shale gas development. I assume that these deposit shocks are unrelated to a bank specific credit demand shocks and to local credit demand shocks in non-shale gas locations. The construction of this variable will be explained in detail in Section 3.
The use of the unsolicited shock allows me to subsume the 'selection' component of the omitted demand variable into the error term, ε t i which is uncorrelated with deposits. I can also dismiss local credit demand terms that are not in shale counties. I denote a bank's exposure to shale gas county credit demand shocks ∆ζ * t i and I rewrite Equation (2.7). ∆L
Assuming a linear form for λ(θ) the coefficient of interest is β D,θ which estimates the sensitivity of loans to a deposit shock.
(2.8) Equation (2.8) is the primary specification for the empirical methodology. I estimate this equation using changes in shale gas county deposit levels as an instrument for change sin deposits. Assuming cov(∆D * t i , ζ * t i ) = 0, estimates of β D and β D,θ will be unbiased. If this covariance is not equal to zero but β ζ,θ = 0, our coefficient of interest, β D,θ , will be unbiased. The comparison of small and large banks exposed to a similar shock allows us to estimate the impact of bank size, even if the average treatment effect is not identified. In discussing the results and robustness checks, I relax these assumptions and consider the potential impact of an omitted variable that has heterogeneous impact on bank lending and is correlated with deposits.
Deposit Shock and Data
In order to identify the role of scope, I require a shock that affects banks of varying sizes, is an unexpected windfall and is also independent of local credit demand. Unconventional energy meets the first two criteria and partially satisfies the third. The potential impact of credit demand on identification will be discussed at length in the robustness section of the results. I describe the recent boom in unconventional energy resources and then summarize the data and the impact on deposits.
Unconventional Energy Shocks
Since 1999, rising energy prices and technological innovation have driven a renaissance in domestic U.S. oil and gas exploration. This new domestic development has relied on the use of unconventional techniques to extract resources from deposits that were once inaccessible or uneconomical. A number of these developments have proven successful, resulting in new oil and gas fields. These developments are unexpected, result in large cash-flows to local landowners, and are financed by large, multinational corporations in national markets. The result is a a significant wealth shock to the local populace that results in significant increases in local bank deposits.
Unconventional energy refers to those oil and gas deposits that require more advanced extraction methods. The most common new resource is 'tight' gas or shale gas. 'Tight' gas is natural gas trapped in particularly impermeable and non-porous rock formations. These characteristics reduce the flow of gas into the well. In addition, these formations tend to run in relatively narrow bands, reducing the effectiveness of a simple vertical well. Advances in drilling technology, hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, have increased the recoverable resources from these fields, encouraging further development.
Horizontal drilling allows a vertical well to extend horizontally into the formation. Advances in the precision of this method have lowered the cost of drilling a horizontal well and increased the yields. Horizontal wells can access a rock formation at distances up to two miles from the vertical well. Once the well is drilled horizontally, hydraulic fracturing (or 'fracking') is used to increase the permeability of the formation. Fracking injects a slurry of water, sand and other chemicals into the well, fracturing the surrounding rock and allowing trapped resources to flow into the well.
While the use of these technologies increases the output of the wells, it also increases the cost. A vertical well can cost as little as $800,000, whereas a modern fracking well can cost $3 to $8 million. These wells require more operational expertise and higher ongoing expenses. In early 2000 the price of gas at the wellhead was $2.73 per one thousand cubic feet Rising oil and gas prices incentivized drillers to refine unconventional methods and improved the rates of return for drillers. Development of these fields evolves over many years. Developers will typically drill a number of test wells to ascertain the output of the formation. Once they are confident in the formation's output, they will expand the acreage they lease from local landowners. Landowners receive payments in the form of an an upfront signing bonus based on the number of acres leased and a royalty on extracted resources. The signing bonus can vary from $10 to $20,000 per acre. The royalty may also vary from 12.8% to upwards of 25%.
9 Generally, these terms vary depending on the established reserves of the field, the desirability of the location, and the price of gas/oil at the time the lease is signed. Costs, as well as the growing technological sophistication, have limited the role of unaffiliated 'wildcatters' or entrepreneurs. The development of unconventional oil and gas fields is dominated by large, well-financed corporations. Major drillers include ExxonMobil, EOG Resources, Chesapeake Energy, Devon Energy, Pioneer Natural Resources, ConocoPhillips, Cabot Oil and Gas, among others. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the direct effect of drilling activity and royalty payments is financed outside the local market.
Nevertheless, this shock is not entirely exogenous to local credit demand. Shale gas development influences local labor markets and households. A transient workforce generally drills wells, while crews remain behind to maintain the wells. Hydraulic fracturing requires firms to handle the processing and disposal of fluid used for fracking -generating demand for complementary businesses. A typical well requires over 5 million gallons of fluid, much of which must be processed after to use to remove additives that are harmful to the water supply. Incremental demand for labor and business generates a positive local credit demand shock that co-varies with my deposit shock.
In addition, there is a wealth shock to local households that impacts local labor demand. In response to the shock, households credit demand may respond positively or negatively. Much of the analysis is concerned with comparing the impact on banks exposed to similar shocks. However, if large and small banks are differentially exposed to local demand shocks the result will be biased. The discussion of the results will consider the potential influence of local credit demand and its sign.
I identify ten fields in seven states that appear to be significant new oil or gas developments that resulted in large pay-outs to local landowners. Seven of the fields are predominantly natural gas fields, three are oil fields. Wells primarily produce gas or oil, but there are oil byproducts from gas wells (condensate), and vice versa -most wells produce both products and both are collected and sold.
The Elm Coulee, Red River, and Bakken initiated development in the 2001-2004 timeframe. These are the three predominantly oil fields. All three tap the same underlying formation of shale (the Bakken Formation) that stretches from Canada to as far south as South Dakota and includes large parts of Montana and North Dakota. Elm Coulee was the earliest and became a proving ground for shale oil extraction from the Bakken Formation. Other hotbeds of activity emerged in Southeast Montana and then Western and Central North Dakota. As recently as 1995 the U.S. Geological Survey estimated that there were 151 million barrels of recoverable oil in the Bakken. In 2008 a revised report raised that estimate to 3.0-4.3 billion technically recoverable barrels (BBL) in Montana and North Dakota (Anna, Pollastro, Gaswirth, Lewan, Lillis, Roberts, Schenk, Charpentier, Cook and Klett 2008) .
10 At $75 a barrel this represents a significant revision in value (about $275bn).
10 For reference, the U.S. consumes approximately 7 billion barrels of oil a year (EIA).
The remaining fields are natural gas fields. The Barnett field is has been under development for decades, however in 2000 drillers began experimenting with more sophisticated techniques. Over several years they found that the combination of horizontal drilling and 'fracking' could greatly increase the recoverable natural gas from the shale formation. By 2003 the USGS had revised its estimates of recoverable resources and determined there were 26.7 trillion cubic feet of gas in the Barnett shale. At $5 per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) this is approximately $130bn worth of natural gas.
Once these the Barnett shale validated the new drilling techniques, drillers expanded exploration to other formation throughout the country. Many fields have not justified further development -the existence of shale is not a sufficient condition for success. Until test wells are drilled and the methods for that formation are fine-tuned, drillers do not know whether the output will justify the cost. I include additional fields that have seen sustained development. 
The Shale Gas Shock and County-Level Data
To gauge the impact of shale development, I collect production and drilling permit data on unconventional oil and gas fields. I identify ten fields in seven states. I collect annual data at the county level from various state agencies. In some states, the data is explicitly broken out by formation and/or well type. For these fields I can directly identify the new oil and gas production attributable to unconventional wells. In other cases, only aggregate production is provided and it is not possible to directly identify output from the new, unconventional development. For these states, I determine a base year, prior to the shale gas discoveries, and assume that incremental production is attributable to the new developments.
11 Table 1 outlines the fields, the year major development began, and the data sources. I use the drilling permit and production data to construct a proxy for the local cashflow into a county j at time t, CF S is in thousand cubic feet, M CF . Oil and gas prices (P Oil and P Gas ) are available from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). I use West Texas Intermediate Crude (WTI) price for oil prices and wellhead gas prices from the relevant region for natural gas prices. I assume a royalty rate of 20% based on the midpoint of reported royalties.
12 The second half of Equation is the upfront bonus paid to landowners. I do not observe lease signings or their bonus terms. However, leases must be held before drilling permits can be granted so I use drilling permits, P ermits t j as a proxy for new lease agreements. I then assume the average number of acres leased per permit, Acreage, and the cash bonus paid per acre, Bonus/Acre. According to the EIA, wells are generally allocated in areas of 60-160 acres 13 , therefore I assume 100 acres per permit and a bonus of $7,500 per acre.
14 Throughout, I only consider the first four years of development as treatment years. I obtain county level deposit data from the FDIC Summary of Deposits (SOD) database. SOD provides deposits by bank and location as of June 30 each year. I aggregate deposits at the county-level annually and calculate two-year growth rates. Figure 1 illustrates that demeaned deposit growth increases as shale gas fields develop and the cash-flow shock rises.
I construct a data set of county-level characteristics to analyze the statistical impact of the shock. I obtain demographic data on counties from the U.S. Census. This list of controls includes the population of the county, the percent of the population with a high-school degree, the share of the population that is hispanic/black, the share of the population that is working age (15-64), and the rural-urban continuum index. I supplement the demographic data with data on local economic activity from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) and the County Business Patterns database. These databases provide me with aggregate and NAICS industry level estimates of wages paid, employment, and small business establishments. I organize this data by calendar year, just as I do with the drilling data.
The resulting panel of U.S. counties has over 3,000 observations per year over a nine year period influenced by shocks. In contrast, my treatment group of 207 county-year 12 These terms are generally not published. I surveyed press reports on shale gas development as well as message boards and websites where landowners discuss the terms of their leases with other interested landowners who may be negotiating a lease.
13 Modern Shale Gas Development in the United States: A Primer, The U.S. Department of Energy 14 Bonuses rose with prices after 2005. Therefore I only include this cash bonus for fields developed more recently (Woodford, Haynesville (LA), Marcellus, and Eagle Ford). These assumptions are not critical, but they allow me to present the shale gas activity as a single dollar index to illustrate its impact on deposit growth.
observations is quite small. In order to compare this treatment group over a common support, I generate a matched sample of similar counties using propensity score matching. p-scores are calculated using a probit of a treatment indicator on log deposits, log employment, average wage, log small business establishments, share of banks that are below the 50th percentile in asset size, deposits/person, log population, county level demographic data, employment share by two-digit NAICS industry, year fixed effects and regional fixed effects. Table 2 summarizes the treatment group, the full sample and the matched sample. Treatment counties are smaller, less dense, and have more energy industry employment than the average county in the full sample.
Impact of CF S on Deposits
I estimate the statistical impact of the cash-flow shock on deposits by running a pooled cross-sectional regression of two year county level deposit growth on the cash-flow shock scaled by trailing deposits and various controls.
Controls include log(Deposits t−2 ), share of the population that is Hispanic, share of the population that is black, percent of the population with a high school degree, share of the population that is of working age (15-64), log of the population and the rural-urban continuum index. When considering the matched sample I also include the p-score, the predicted probability of being in the treatment group from the matching exercise. Table 3 contains the results of the regression using the full sample of counties and the matched sample. As the results are consistent in both significance and magnitude across the two samples, I will not discuss them independently. Columns 1-3 demonstrate that the cash-flow shock is significant and robust to the inclusion of county-level controls and year fixed effects. A coefficient of .2 is economically reasonable; 20% of every dollar is deposited in the bank.
Column 4 seeks to address the claim that this deposit shock is the result of additional employment activity related to drilling. I include controls for small business lending and total wages paid. As we can see, wages paid significantly impacts deposit growth, but does not mitigate the impact of the cash-flow shock. Columns 5 and 6 test the importance of the shock in subperiods pre and post financial crisis. A significant coefficient estimate of approximately .2 is consistent across these two periods.
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CF S is premised on a number of assumptions in 3.2 and is a noisy predictor of excess deposit growth. Given that I know the treatment counties and that there is a statistically significant cash-flow shock effect, I can match these treatment counties to peers. I calculate an excess deposit shock by comparing the treatment group of shale gas counties, %∆D T reat,t j , to the mean of their 15 nearest neighbor peers from that matching exercise above, %∆D M atch,t j . The result is a county-level excess deposit shock for treatment counties relative to their peers,
I use this as a proxy for an unsolicited deposit shock. Counties with positive excess growth are considered treatment counties. Table 4 summarizes the shock by year. In the early periods (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) ) the shock to deposits ratio is relatively small. Only a few counties are impacted and many of those that are impacted are in the earliest stages of development. The average excess deposit growth is actually negative in three of the four years. By 2005-2006, the cash-flow shock has grown in these counties as royalties and drilling development pick-up. When I consider sub-periods I will focus on these later years where the sample is richer.
A bank's response to a deposit inflow depends on whether the shock is temporary or permanent. If banks anticipate that the deposit inflows will be reversed, they will invest in more liquid, shorter maturity assets. The observed time-series for many of these fields is short. However, the average excess deposit growth once a field begins development is never negative in my sample (see Table 5 ), suggesting that the level shock to deposits is relatively persistent. In 2009, a decline in energy prices reduced expected royalties, however excess deposit growth was on average positive (see Table 4 ). The evidence suggests the deposit shock is relatively permanent, limiting the need for banks to invest in liquid, short-term assets.
Bank Data
To evaluate the impact of the shock on banks, I construct a panel of financial data from bank regulatory agencies. Chartered commercial banks must provide detailed financials to the FDIC on a quarterly basis in Call Reports of Income and Condition. Bank-holding companies must provide similar reports to the Federal Reserve. Many commercial bank are subsidiaries of bank holding companies. As bank size is an important factor in my analysis, I am careful to attribute all banks to their highest holder. If the high-holder is a bank holding company with assets more than $250m, the bank holding company is required to report consolidated financials on form FR Y-9C. I use the consolidated entity financials for these firms. However, if the high holder is a small bank holding company or a non bank financial institution, the high-holder may not report consolidated financials. In these instances I consolidate accounts across parent bank's unconsolidated balance sheets and their subsidiaries to generate consolidated high-holder financials. I only retain the June 30 report so as to match bank balance sheets to the corresponding deposit shocks form the SOD I link the panel of banks to counties using the SOD. The FDIC data provides deposit locations by bank. I aggregate the deposit shock for each bank by weighting %∆D * t j by the share of its deposits held in the county and summing across all of the relevant counties. This creates a bank-level unsolicited deposit shock, denoted i, from the county level shocks, j. Branches that enter an energy shock county after the start date in Table  1 receive a zero weight. The deposit shocks will mechanically impact larger firms less as the shock is scaled by larger and larger bank values. Table 6 summarizes the shock across a range of bank sizes to illustrate the variation in the shock at various size percentiles. The shock has a sizable impact, up to 5% of assets, though the 99th percentile (or about $1bn in assets). For the largest banks, the maximum observed shock falls dramatically. How is it possible that the shock impacts such a wide array of sizes so similarly? First, as assets grow, banks tend to have a greater share of local deposits, increasing their exposure to the shock. Second,as banks branch out they are more likely to be exposed to multiple shock counties. Another important takeaway from Table 6 is that the relevant sample is banks with less than $500m in assets. In the remaining analysis I exclude firms with more than $1.2bn.
As at the county level, I have a surfeit of untreated bank observations that do not share a common support with the treatment group. My treatment sample of bank-year observations is 418 and the total sample of bank-year observation from 2001-2009 is greater than 46,000. I again generate a smaller, matched sample, against which to compare my treatment group. I match each bank to its 5 nearest neighbors using propensity score matching. I calculate the propensity score using a probit of a treatment dummy on bank financial controls, county-level characteristics and year fixed-effects. I exclude banks that have been in the sample less than two years, have made an acquisition or sale of assets in the past two years, or whose assets are predominantly credit cards.
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The financial controls consist of bank characteristics as of June 30th prior to the start of the relevant calendar year. I include log asset size, return-on-assets, the reserve ratio, tier 1 capital ratio, and indicators for the type of high-holder. The county-level characteristics are weighted by the percent of deposits the bank has in the county and summed to create a bank level exposure to county controls. The county controls include the log population size, the share of the population of working age, the percent with high school degrees, the share that are Hispanic, the share that are black, the rural-urban continuum index and the deposits per person. The results of the matching exercise can be seen in Table 7 .
Analysis and Results
First, I characterize the average response to the unsolicited deposit shock. Then, I consider the role of size heterogeneity using two-staged-least squares. Finally, I discuss the potential impact omitted variable bias and perform a series of robustness checks.
Average Effect
Before checking for the impact of heterogeneity, I examine the average impact of my unsolicited shock. In order to do so I estimate the following pooled cross-sectional regressions using 2SLS.
∆ indicates a two-year difference scaled by assets, A t−2 , and τ t are year fixed-effects.
β D can be interpreted as the percent of deposits invested in the dependent variable. X t i is a vector of fixed effects and control variables that predate the shale gas shock. ∆D * t i = %∆D * t i A t−2 is the instrument for a bank's change in deposits.
15 I identify bank mergers and major asset sales using the most recent Merger Information file provided by the Bank of Chicago Federal Reserve.
I Winsorize changes in deposits and left-hand side variables at the 1% level to minimize the importance of extreme outliers in the analysis. I limit control variables to the propensity score and an indicator for the type of high-holder (commercial bank, bank holding company, small bank holding company or other finance company). Standard errors are clustered by the state of the bank's primary operations to account for potential serial correlation and shared shocks that may impact regions in the cross-section.In addition to total loans on the left-hand side, I consider liquid assets (cash, securities and federal funds sold), non-deposit borrowing of the bank, commercial and industrial loans, small business loans (SBL), and real-estate loans. Table 8 summarizes the results of these regressions. Panel A contains the OLS estimates of β D , Panel B summarizes the results from 2SLS using the county-level deposit shock as an instrument. The F -stat for the test of excluded instruments in the first stage regression (far left, second section) is 40.16. In both panels, note that the sum of a change in loans (Column 2), liquid securities (Column 3)and borrowings (Column 4) is approximately one. Incremental financing is most likely allocated to one of these three uses.
Comparing the coefficients on deposits in Panels A and B reveals the nature of the endogeneity. Without instrumenting, about 70% of the incremental deposits are allocated to loans, whereas 36% are allocated to cash or securities. However, after instrumenting for 'selection' banks that receive the unsolicited deposit shock put 67% of the incremental deposits into liquid assets. This is consistent with the selection story that OLS estimates are biased toward lending. The largest difference appears to come from real-estate loans (which also represent the largest lending class on banks' balance sheets). Note that the average bank holds 62% of its assets in loans. Before even exploring the role of scope, it appears that positive, unsolicited shocks are are much less likely to be lent than the static balance sheet suggests.
The decline in borrowing (Column 4) also supports my interpretation of the shock. Lending and borrowing are biased upward because growing firms in need of capital seek additional sources of funding. The unsolicited deposit shock leads to a decrease in lending. In fact, this is a prediction of the model, cheaper financing in the form of deposits obviates the need for more expensive outside capital. While not conclusive, these results also suggest that any coinciding local demand shock is small relative to the deposit shock, as lending is decreasing as a share of assets.
Panel C examines the impact of a deposit shock in 3 sub-periods, the early period 
Role of Scale
To estimate the role of scale, I need to interact the instrument with a proxy for bank scale. The interaction of the instrument, ∆D * t i with another exogenous variable creates a nonlinear IV. I address this using a method outlined in (Wooldridge 2002). I instrument for both ∆D 
The results for the second stage are summarized in Table 9 . The first stage tests for excluded instruments exceed 10 in all but one case. The interaction term ( ∆D t iθ t i ) in the '05-'06 period the has an F -stat of 9.2.
Panel A contains the impact of the deposit shock on the change in loans and on the change in net liquidity (∆N etLiquid t i ), where net liquidity is the change in liquid assets (cash, securities and federal funds sold) less the change in other borrowings (including federal funds purchased, repurchase agreements, and preferred securities). I consider the entire sample (Columns 1-2) the boom period (Columns 3-4) and the crisis period If there is a significant local credit demand shock that heterogeneously impacts the banks, it may be biasing these results. Recall Equation (2.8). If cov(D * t i , ∆ζ * t i ) = 0 and the relationship is non-linear with respect to size, the local shock may bias our coefficient of interest. Assuming the estimates are biased, we need to consider whether the omitted variable is bolstering or attenuating the estimated impact of heterogeneity.
Assuming that the unobserved shock is positively correlated with the deposit shock and that large banks are less susceptible to the shock (β ζθ < 0) then our estimates of the interaction term are biased toward zero as it should increase small banks lending relative to large banks. However, if the credit demand shock is negative, small banks lending may be biased downward relative to large banks, biasing our estimates away from zero.
If a credit demand shock is negatively correlated with the unsolicited deposits, I would expect it to be via household debt paydown. While if there is a positive shock, it would be for incremental business loans as economic activity picks up. Panel B, Columns 1-3, estimates the 2SLS from Panel A with specific loan categories as the dependent variable. Each category of loan, C&I, small business, and real estate, is increasing in bank size. Given the expectation that demand for C&I and small business loans are more likely to be positively impacted by the concurrent shale gas development, they should be biased towards zero. Therefore the significant and positive results in Columns 1 and 2 are consistent with size mattering, even if the actual coefficient is biased.
Column 4 illustrates that the primary asset that small banks invest in at the expense of loans is securities. A one standard deviation decrease in log assets increases the allocation to net liquidity in the 2007-2009 time-frame by 35% with 19% allocated to securities. Column 5 finds that the change in loan deposit ratios for banks is increasing with bank size, consistent with our other findings. Column 6 looks at the change in return on assets which do not appear correlated with the interaction term, but are increasing with exposure to the deposit shock.
Robustness
I perform a number of robustness tests to address sources of potential bias. For simplicity, I focus solely on changes in lending. The empirical methodology is the same as Table 9 , but with varying controls and fixed effects. Table 10 contains the results from these robustness checks.
First, I construct a proxy for local credit demand, ∆ζ t i , that should be independent of the impact of local deposit shocks. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) collects small business lending for each county by all banks greater than $1bn in assets. I calculate the average growth in small business lending by these banks and take the weighted sum to generate a proxy for local credit demand shocks for each bank. Column 1 proxies for local credit demand using the weighted sum of small business lending growth by banks >$1.2bn and its interaction with bank size. Including this proxy does appear to be positively correlated with lending in Column 5, but it does not mitigate the coefficient on the interaction term between size and deposits. This measure of local credit demand does not influence earlier results.
Thus far the analysis has largely ignored changes in bank equity. 17 Retained earnings can also influence the allocation decision. If retained earnings are correlated with the deposit shock, omitting them will bias the results. Addressing this concern is straightforward. I include changes in common equity scaled by assets at t − 2, ∆K t i , and its interaction with demeaned log assets,θ t i as additional regressors. The results are summarized in Column 2. Changes in internal capital are positively correlated with loans (more so than deposits), however there is no meaningful change in the deposit shock coefficients. Column 3 includes additional bank level controls (from prior to the advent of the shock, so t − 2) to better account for other sources of bank heterogeneity. I include the return-on-assets, the reserve ratio and the tier1 capital ratio. Again, the results do very little to alter the conclusions. Return-on-assets is surprisingly negatively related to lending during this time period. The other variables do not have a significant relationship with changes in lending.
17 I excluded this account from the formulation of Equation (2.6) to simplify exposition. Including internal capital (K t i ) as an additional source of funds produces
where internal capital is the sum of retained earnings.
Another concern may be that some counties/regions are more sensitive to local demand shocks and that these areas are biased toward larger banks. Therefore, the larger banks are allocating more toward lending because of unobserved heterogeneity in the impact of a wealth shock on loan demand. To account for this possibility, I consider a specification with fixed effects by field and fixed effects by county. If variation in propensity to lend is location specific, these fixed-effects should account for that.
Columns 4 and 5 include field and county fixed-effects, respectively, instead of year fixed-effects. The results are again consistent, both in magnitude and significance, to those found earlier. The coefficient on the interaction of deposits and bank size is approximately .3 for loans, with both of the coefficients significant at the 1% level.
Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that bank size plays an important role in the allocation of incremental financial resources. Banks that received an unsolicited deposit shock allocated the proceeds of this shock differently depending on their size. This was particularly true during the crisis period 2007-2009. Small banks were more likely to pay down debt and invest in securities than make incremental loans. Robustness tests suggest that this variation is not the result of location fixed effects or concurrent local credit demand. While other explanations remain (distressed small banks). The results suggest that deposits can lead to banks with too many assets, that resort to securities to warehouse those assets. It appears that small banks have greater trouble allocating these incremental funds. Figure 1 compares two-year county deposit growth to the intervening annual cash-flow shock from shale gas (CF S) scaled by lagged deposits. County level deposit data based on growth in commercial banking deposits from the FDIC's Summary of Deposits. Deposit data is as of June 30, therefore two-year deposit growth is used relative to annual gas and oil data that begins and ends during the intervening calendar year. Deposit growth demeaned by year. Table 1 describes the unconventional fields used to identify unsolicited deposit shocks. Table 2 summarizes the county characteristics for the shale gas counties, the full sample of counties and a matched sample of counties. Treatment county-years are limited to the first four years of development in a shale-gas county. The matched sample is constructed by matching to the 15 nearest counties using propensity score matching. p-scores are calculated using a probit of a treatment indicator on log(Deposits t−1 , log(Employment t−1 ), log(AverageW ages t−1 ), log(SmallBusinesses t−1 ), U nitBankShare, Deposits/P erson, log(P opulation), county level demographic data, employment share by two-digit NAICS industry, year fixed effects and regional fixed effects. Table 3 regresses two-year deposit growth on the shale gas cash-flow shock and various controls. Dependent variable is two-year deposit growth winsorized at the 1% level. Deposit growth is used relative to annual gas and oil data (CF S) that begins and ends during the intervening calendar year. Full sample includes all counties. %∆SBLV al and %∆SBLN o are the calendar year percent changes in value for new small business loans and the percent change in the number of new small business loans for banks over $1.1bn. %∆W ages is the calendar year growth in wages paid in the county. Controls include log(Deposits t−2 and county-level demographic data. The matched sample matches treatment counties to 15 other counties based on nearest neighbor propensity score matching. p-scores calculated using log(Deposits t−1 , log(Employment t−1 ), log(AverageW ages t−1 ), log(SmallBusinesses t−1 ), U nitBankShare, Deposits/P erson, log(P opulation), county level demographic data, employment share by 2-digit NAICS industry, year and regional fixed effects. Controls for the matched sample regressions include the propensity score, log(Deposits t−2 and county-level demographic data. SE's are clustered by state. t-stats in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Table 4 summarizes data on the estimated cash-flow shock by year. CF S are estimated royalty and leasing bonuses paid in thousands of dollars. CF S/D t−1 is the ratio of these payments to deposits as of June 30th in the prior year. %∆D * t j is the excess deposit growth in treatment counties relative to a matched sample of similar counties. Table 5 summarizes excess deposit growth in event time since the origination of a field. %∆D * is the excess two-year deposit growth relative to a matched sample of similar counties. σ(%∆D * ) is the standard deviation. Excess deposit growth does not appear to reverse, suggesting the shocks to deposits are relatively persistent. Table 6 summarizes data on the estimated unsolicited deposit shock by size percentile. Percentiles are determined by real asset value each year. Assets are corrected for inflation. to 5 nearest neighbor banks using propensity score matching. p-scores calculated using year fixed-effects, lagged bank characteristics (log real assets, ROA, reserve ratio, and tier1 capital ratio), weighted average of location demographics, and dummy variables for type of high-holder (bank-holding company, commercial bank, other). Table 8 estimates the impact of deposit growth on bank balance sheet allocations. Panel A contains OLS of two-year bank balance sheet changes on deposits. Panel B 2SLS of bank balance sheet changes using the shale gas shock as an instrument from [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . Column 1 is the first stage, the F -test for excluded instruments is greater than 10. Panel C 2SLS of bank balance sheet changes using the shale gas shock interacted with dummy variables for specific time-periods. This specification involves three first stage equations and three instruments, each for the designated time period. F -Tests for excluded instruments exceed 10 for all three. Column 1 in Panel C contains the OLS estimate of loan growth on deposits growth, ∆ signifies change over two year period from June-to-June scaled by assets at t − 2 assets. Liquid includes cash, securities and federal funds sold. SBL are small business loans (defined as business loans < $1), RE are real-estate loans, C&I are commercial and industrial loans, Borrow other borrowings from the liability side of the bank's balance sheet, including repurchase agreements. Suppressed controls include the propensity score, indicators for the type of high-holder (commercial bank, bank holding company, small bank holding company or other finance company), and year-fixed effects. SE's are clustered by the primary state of the banks operations. t-stats in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Table 10 contains 2SLS estimation of two-year deposit growth on the unsolicited shock and its interaction with size. Instruments for ∆D t i and (∆D t iθ ) using ∆D * t i and ( ∆D t iθ ). ∆ indicates change over two year period from June-to-June scaled by assets at t − 2 assets. Columns 1 includes a proxy for local credit demand, ∆ζ t i using the weighted sum of small business lending growth by banks >$1.2bn and its interaction with bank size. Column 2 includes changes in bank equity scaled by assets, ∆K t i and its interaction with banks size. Column 3 Includes other bank level controls including the ROA, the reserve ratio and the tier 1 capital ratio. Columns 4 and 5 include field and county fixed effects, respectively, rather than year fixed effects. θ is the log of the real asset value andθ is the demeaned value of θ. Controls include the propensity score, indicators for the type of high-holder (commercial bank, bank holding company, small bank holding company or other finance company), and year-fixed effects. SE's are clustered by the primary state of the banks operations. t-stats in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is employment growth excluding mining and drilling. Controls include the propensity score and year-fixed effects. θ in columns 2 and 3 is the % of banks in the county that are below the 50th percentile for asset size. In columns 4 and 5 θ is the share of deposits held by banks below the 50th percentile for asset size. SE's are clustered by state. t-stats in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
